We assess the role played by …scal policy in explaining the dynamics of asset markets. Using a panel of ten industrialized countries, we show that a positive …scal shock has a negative impact in both stock and housing prices. However, while stock prices immediately adjust to the shock and the e¤ect of …scal policy is temporary, housing prices gradually and persistently fall. As a result, the attempts of …scal policy to mitigate stock price developments may severely de-stabilize housing markets. The empirical …ndings also point to: (i) a contractionary e¤ect of …scal policy on output in line with the existence of crowding-out e¤ects; (ii) a weakening of the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy in recent times; (iii) signi…cant …scal multiplier e¤ects in the context of severe housing busts; and (iv) an increase of the sensitivity of asset prices to …scal policy shocks following the process of …nancial deregulation and mortgage liberalization. Finally, the evidence suggests that changes in equity prices may help governments towards consolidation of public …nances.
Introduction
e¤ects of …scal poly on asset prices using a panel of ten industrialized countries, namely, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S.. Second, we use quarterly data, which allows us to identify more precisely the impact of …scal policy measures.
To the best of our knowledge, such …scal data set has not yet been used in the strand of economic modelling embodied in the paper. This is also a novelty with respect to the related literature which, generally, focuses on annual data to analyze a broad set of countries. Third, we estimate a Panel Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) and, therefore, allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity, while treating all variables in the system as endogenous. Similarly, the PVAR approach allows us to increase the e¢ ciency of the statistical inference, which would otherwise su¤er from a small number of degrees of freedom of the country-level Vector Auto-Regression (VAR).
Our work suggests that …scal policy plays a major role in asset markets. In fact, the results show that a positive …scal shock has a negative impact in both stock and housing prices. However, the dynamics of the reaction is quite di¤erent. In fact, stock prices immediately adjust to the shock, but the e¤ect of …scal policy is temporary and quickly erodes. Stock prices start recovering after eight quarters, in anticipation of the positive e¤ects on output. On the contrary, the impact of …scal policy on housing prices exhibits strong persistence: housing prices gradually fall after the change in the …scal stance, the trough is reached after eight quarters, and then slowly return to their initial level. In consequence, housing prices remain depressed even thirty quarters-ahead.
This piece of evidence has a dramatic policy implication. In the attempt of stabilizing …nancial markets and mitigating movements in stock prices, governments may negatively and persistently impact on housing markets. Consequently, the lack of synchronization in the timing of the response of stock and housing prices suggests that one can not use …scal policy to simultaneously stabilize the two asset markets.
The empirical …ndings also point to a contractionary e¤ect of …scal policy on output and the key mechanism seems to be explained by the existence of crowding-out e¤ects: a positive …scal shock leads to an increase in the interest rate, that is, the cost of debt re…nancing. Nevertheless, as the shock erodes and interest rate goes back to its initial level, output starts recovering and the response becomes positive at longer horizons. In consequence, the use of …scal policy as a tool to recover the economy may be undermined by its contractionary e¤ects in the short-run.
While our paper focuses on the role of …scal policy as a driver of asset price dynamics, one may also question on whether asset prices in ‡uence …scal policy. We …nd that the e¤ects of stock market shocks on …scal policy are greater in magnitude than the ones associated to housing prices. This, therefore, suggests that, rather than housing market movements, changes in equity prices may decisively contribute 3 to the goal of …scal consolidation.
The robustness of the results is assessed in several directions. First, we show that …scal policy actions can have signi…cant multiplier e¤ects when undertaken in the outcome of severe housing busts, which gives rise to the importance of the implementation of …scal stimulus packages. Second, we …nd that the expansionary e¤ect of …scal policy has somewhat weakened in recent times and, as a result, asset markets have become more sensitive to a deterioration in …scal stance. Third, the process of …nancial deregulation and mortgage liberalization might have contributed to the change in the degree of e¤ectiveness of …scal policy, as the competitiveness of national banking sector became strongly related to the commitment of government to credible and sound policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the relationship between …scal policy and asset prices. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the results, while Section 6 assesses the robustness of the …ndings. Finally, Section 7 concludes and summarizes the main policy implications.
A Brief Review of the Literature
Despite the major …scal developments of the last decades, the attention of academics, central banks and governments has been typically directed towards monetary policy and its linkage with asset markets. 1 ; 2 For instance, Granville and Mallick (2009) investigate the nexus between monetary stability and …nan-cial stability. The authors show that the interest rate instrument used for in ‡ation targeting (monetary stability) is conducive to …nancial stability (proxied by the term structure of interest rates, share prices, exchange rates, property price in ‡ation and the deposit-loan ratio of the banking sector). Ra…q and Mallick (2008) examine the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks on output in the three largest euro area economies -Germany, France and Italy (EMU3) -and show that there is a lack of homogeneity in the responses. Sousa (2010a Sousa ( , 2010c shows that, for the Euro Area as whole and the U.S., housing wealth e¤ects associated to a monetary policy contraction are very persistent, while …nancial wealth e¤ects are of short duration. Additionally, the monetary authority pays a special attention to developments in monetary aggregates, but the monetary policy rule also suggests the adoption of a vigilant posture regarding …nancial markets. Similarly, Castro (2008) …nds evidence of nonlinearity in the monetary policy rule, in particular, vis-a-vis …nancial conditions. This, in turn, makes economies less vulnerable to a credit crunch. 1 For a summary of the empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on housing prices, see Aoki et al. (2004) and Iacoviello (2005 The role of …scal policy in explaining both housing market developments and stock market dynamics should not, however, be neglected. In fact, …scal policy can a¤ect housing prices via subsidies, tax measures and its (wealth) e¤ects on household's disposable income: capital taxes on housing gains, tax deductibility of interest payments, taxation of the imputed rental value of the house, and VAT on new houses are just a few examples of how …scal policy can dramatically impact on housing markets. In fact, given that housing supply is typically inelastic in the short-run, …scal subsidies targeted to the acquisition of a house may end up pushing up its demand and prices. Similarly, tax deductibility of interest rates may in ‡uence the demand for mortgage debt. In addition, sounder …scal positions and lower sovereign …nancing needs allow for lower interest and better …nancing conditions for mortgage-loans, while higher government indebtedness can crowd-out resources away from home-owners (Maclennan et al., 1999) .
As for the link between …scal policy and stock prices, …scal consolidations that lead to a permanent and substantial fall in government debt or signal sounder …scal behaviour are typically related with increases in stock market prices (Ardagna, 2009) . Similarly, …scal policy measures may impact on sovereign risk spreads and …nancial markets may also be in ‡uenced by the interaction between …scal variables and political institutions (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008) .
From the empirical point of view, the evidence on the linkages between …scal policy, housing prices and stock prices is roughly inexistent. Using Canadian data, Darrat (1990) Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) …nd that revenue-based adjustment lowers sovereign risk spreads more than spending-based adjustment.
Financial markets also react to more to cuts in current spending than cuts in investment. Moreover, debt-…nanced spending increases sovereign risk, while tax-…nanced spending lowers spreads. Arin et al. 
Empirical Methodology
We use a Panel-data Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR) methodology to assess the e¤ects of …scal policy on asset prices. This framework combines the panel-data approach (that allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity) with the traditional Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) approach (that treats all variables in the system as endogenous). The …rst-order VAR model is speci…ed as follows:
where Y it is a vector of endogenous variables, 0 is a vector of constants, (L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator, and " it is a vector of error terms. 3 The vector of endogenous variables includes the property price index (HOU SE it ), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP it ), the price level (P it ), the primary government de…cit (DEF it ), the interest rate (IR it ), and the equity price index (EQ it ). In practice, it can be expressed as Y it = [HOU SE it ; GDP it ; P it ; DEF it ; IR it ; EQ it ] 0 . Our model also allows for country-speci…c …xed e¤ects, f i , and country-speci…c time dummies, d c;t , in order to capture aggregate and country-speci…c macroeconomic shocks. These dummies are eliminated by subtracting the means of each variable calculated for each country-year.
The advantage of using the PVAR approach is that it increases the e¢ ciency of the statistical inference. In fact, the estimation of country-level VARs would su¤er from a small number of degrees of freedom due to the lack of available data. Moreover, despite the fact that cross-country di¤erences are disregarded in the model (as it imposes the same underlying structure for each cross-section unit), Gavin and Theodorou (2005) note that the PVAR approach also allows one to uncover common dynamic relationships. In addition, this problem can be overcome by introducing …xed e¤ects. However, given the correlation between the …xed e¤ects and the regressors (due to the lags of the dependent variables), the commonly used mean-di¤erencing procedure produces biased estimates (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988), in particular, when the time dimension is small (Nickell, 1981) .
We avoid the drawback of the …xed e¤ects estimator by following a two-stage procedure in which: (i)
we use a forward mean-di¤erencing approach (the 'Helmert procedure') that removes only the mean of all future observations available for each country-year (Arellano and Bover, 1995) ; and (ii) we estimate the system by GMM, using the lags of the regressors as instruments, therefore, keeping the orthogonality between lagged regressors and transformed variables unchanged (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . Given that the number of regressors is equal to the number of instruments, the model is "just identi…ed" and the system GMM is equivalent to a two-stage least squares estimator applied equation by equation (Love 3 The vector of error terms, " it , has zero mean and a country-speci…c variance, i .
and Zicchino, 2006).
In what concerns the impulse-response functions, we transform the system in a "recursive" VAR and impose a triangular identi…cation structure (Hamilton, 1994) . 4 We follow the usual Choleski decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of residuals, and assume that the interest rate and the equity price adjust simultaneously to shocks to …scal policy, while the housing price, the GDP, and the price level only react with a lag.
The ordering of the variables in the system and, speci…cally, for the GDP, the price level, the primary …scal de…cit and the interest rate, is common in the literature on …scal policy. 5 Regarding asset prices, one needs to distinguish between the ordering of equity price and housing price. The equity price was ordered last as it refers to assets that are traded in markets where auctions take place instantaneously.
By its turn, the housing price was ordered …rst in the system for the following reasons. First, housing markets are inherently sticky and housing prices do not immediately reach the equilibrium after the …scal policy shock. Second, there is a "time-to-build" argument showing that it takes time for developers to bring new houses to the market or to work o¤ inventories when demand increases. Third, the matching between the needs of buyers and sellers requires time. Fourth, there are important transaction costs inherent to trading housing up or down.
Data and Summary Statistics
We use quarterly data for ten industrialized countries. The data are available in the following samples: Property Price Index (HOU SE it ). Obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
GDP (GDP t ). Used as a proxy for economic activity and business cycle and provided by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (in the case of the U.S..), the O¢ ce for National Statistics (for the U.K.), the Bank of Portugal (for Portugal) and the International Financial Statistics of the IMF (for the remaining countries). 4 The orthogonalized shocks can be interpreted as reduced-form but not as structural shocks. This could be achieved by imposing some sort of sign restrictions (Mountford and Uhlig, 2008), long-run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) or short-run restrictions (Sims and Zha, 2006) and estimating the VAR at the country level. Unfortunately, the sample sizes at the country-level are relatively short and do not allow one to be con…dent on the statistical inference based on these approaches. Consequently, the PVAR approach appears to be the most appropriate framework. 5 See, for instance, Fatás and Mihov (2001) . Note, however, that changing the ordering of the variables does not have a signi…cant impact on the results. All variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in natural logarithms of real terms with the obvious exception of the interest rate. National currency data for all years prior to the switch of the euro area countries to the euro have been converted using the …xed euro conversion rate in order to provide comparable series across time for each country.
Price (P it
A summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables is reported in Table 1 , while a detailed description of the data sources and data construction is provided in Appendix A. Table 1 shows that, in general, stock prices exhibit more dispersion that housing prices, therefore, re ‡ecting the typically larger volatility that one observes in those markets. The sample average of the government de…cit is about 6.6%, that is, almost double of the threshold de…ned by the Maastricht criteria. Note, however, that the sample includes countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. which are not euro area members.
Moreover, the time coverage (1970-2007) also includes observations from periods that are prior to that set of rules that impose …scal discipline. 5 Empirical Results
Baseline Model
Given that the major goal of the paper is to assess the impact of unexpected variation in …scal policy on asset prices, we estimate the PVAR represented by system (1) after the …xed e¤ects have been removed. Table 2 summarizes the parameter estimates. It is interesting to note that the majority of the variables included in the system (with the exception of the interest rate) exhibits a relatively strong persistence. This may, therefore, lead to the existence of substantial di¤erences between the short-run and the long-run responses of the variables to di¤erent shocks. In particular, in the case of …scal de…cit, it can also be explained by some inertia of the budgetary process.
The dynamics of housing prices is negatively correlated with real interest rates, suggesting the negative relationship between monetary policy and this set of asset prices. The same negative linkages can be found for stock prices, although the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant. This probably re ‡ects the existence of a small or temporary e¤ect of monetary policy on stock prices.
In what concerns …scal policy, one can see that it positively impinges on real interest rates in a very signi…cant way. This is in line with the studies that …nd a positive link between de…cits and the long-term interest rates (Hoelscher, 1986; Cebula and Rhodd, 1993) . 6 In addition, …scal policy seems to be negatively related with housing prices and positively linked with stock prices. bootstrapped con…dence bands based on 10000 draws. It shows that asset prices react in a very di¤erent manner to the shock in …scal policy: while the e¤ect on housing prices is signi…cant and negative, in the case of stock prices, the …ndings do not reveal a statistically signi…cant e¤ect. Moreover, the response of housing prices is highly persistent and the trough is reached after about seven quarters, but housing prices are below their initial level for almost twenty-…ve quarters. In contrast, the adjustment of stock prices is quick and temporary. HOU SE it ; GDP it ; P it ; DEF it ; IR it ; EQ it ).
Response of HOUSE to Shock in DEFICIT This evidence suggests that the credit channel from …scal policy shocks mainly operates via the housing market. Consistently, the temporary and immediate increase in the interest rates seems to lead to a fall in the private sector's housing demand and, therefore, induce a downward adjustment in housing prices. In the case of stock prices, the credit channel matters only for a short period (of about two quarters). Notably, after the …scal shock occurs, the rise in the interest rates makes the stock market a less attractive place for the allocation of savings. As a consequence, share prices immediately fall. However, as the shock erodes, stock prices start recovering in anticipation of the expansionary e¤ects of …scal policy on output.
Actually, GDP starts to signi…cantly fall for about six quarters before it gradually recovers. This is Whelan (1997) also …nd an expansionary e¤ect associated to contractionary …scal policy, in particular, when undertaken in a situation of public accounts distress and coordinated with an adequate exchange rate policy. Non-Keynesian e¤ects may indeed emerge when the …scal consolidation programme appears to the public as a serious attempt to reduce the public sector borrowing requirements. In that case, an induced wealth e¤ect may emerge, leading to an increase in private consumption (Sutherland, 1997) . However, if the …scal consolidation is not seen as credible, then the negative Keynesian e¤ect on consumption will prevail. The response of the price level shows that is signi…cantly rises after the shock with the peak e¤ect being reached after twelve quarters. This corroborates the …scal theory of the price level that takes into account monetary and …scal policy interactions and assumes that …scal policy may determine the price level even if monetary authorities pursue an in ‡ation targeting strategy (Woodford, 1995) .
These …ndings deserve some further comments. First, from a theoretical perspective, the structural relationship between …scal de…cit, interest rates and GDP can be interpreted as referring to the so-called "crowding-out" e¤ect. Indeed, when governments run a budget de…cit and fund it by borrowing on the domestic capital market (for instance, by selling Treasury Bills), they place an upward pressure on real interest rates. This, in turn, stimulates savings in the private sector and discourages or "crowdsout" private consumption and investment. Consequently, aggregate demand may fall. Second, …scal policy shocks may also a¤ect domestic interest rates through their impact on households' and …rms'
expectations. For example, if agents believe that the increase in debt that is used to …nance the budget de…cit will be funded by a raise in future taxation -that is, if they act in a Ricardian manner -, then one might observe an increase in current savings. 7 Third, to the extent that agents'expectations are consistent with the existence of in ‡ationary e¤ects due to large budget de…cits, the increase in in ‡ation (risk) premium will be embedded into interest rates and rise them. Once again, the …nal e¤ect of the upward adjustment in the interest rates will be a fall in the level of real GDP. In Table 3 , we report the variance decomposition of the variables included in the PVAR at the horizon of thirty quarters. Similarly, Figure 2 plots the forecast-error variance decomposition to a …scal policy shock over di¤erent time horizons. The evidence corroborates the previous …ndings: unexpected variation in the …scal stance explains just a small fraction of the forecast-error variance decomposition of stock prices (thin solid line), but it plays an important role in generating the dynamics of housing prices.(thin and dotted line) even thirty quarters-ahead. In addition, …scal shocks substantially and persistently impact on prices and interest rates, which gives echo to the current developments in bond markets, especially, given the di¢ culties faced by some highly-indebted governments in trying to raise the necessary funds. Finally, the evolution of the forecast-error variance decomposition of GDP suggests that …scal policy plays a negligible role, which casts some doubts about the e¤ectiveness of the current …scal stimulus packages. Note, however, that these results have not been conditioned on the state of the economy, a feature that may be crucial indeed. In order to investigate the potential multidirectional linkage between …scal policy and asset prices, Figure 3 displays the impulse-response functions of …scal policy to, respectively, a shock in housing prices and a shock in stock prices. The evidence suggests that the e¤ects of asset price shocks on …scal policy are signi…cant and highly persistent. Interestingly, the negative response of …scal de…cit indicates that unexpected variation in asset prices contribute to …scal consolidation. In particular, the reduction of government de…cit seems larger in magnitude in the case of stock price shocks (a 2.4% fall versus a 0.5% fall in the case of housing prices). This suggests that changes in stock prices (rather than housing market movements) can play a prominent role towards the achievement of a sounder and more sustainable …scal stance. 
Sensitivity Analysis
We now assess the robustness of the previous results in several directions. First, we investigate if the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy has changed over time. Second, we evaluate the role of …scal deregulation and the importance of the process of mortgage liberalization. Finally, we ask whether the …scal stimulus packages help boosting the recovery.
Have asset markets become more sensitive to …scal policy?
This section examines whether the impact of …scal policy on asset prices (and economic activity) has changed over time. To that end, we estimate the PVAR model speci…ed in ( In anticipation of the expansionary e¤ect on output, the demand for …nancial assets increases and stock prices quickly rise. In what concerns housing prices, our analysis suggests that the e¤ect of …scal policy tends to be signi…cantly negative only in the …rst few quarters, and as a result of the "crowdingout" e¤ect generated by the increase in interest rates. From the …fth quarter onwards, housing prices gradually recover and the impact of …scal policy remains signi…cant even thirty quarters-ahead.
As for the second sub-sample period (1985:1-2007:4), the results displayed in Figure 5 show that …scal policy e¤ects are dramatically di¤erent. The pattern of the response of GDP suggests that, after the mid eighties, the …scal multiplier has become negative, therefore, providing evidence of a "NonKeynesian" e¤ect of …scal policy. This result is consistent with the common wisdom that …scal policy e¤ects has substantially weakened over the last twenty years (Perotti, 2004) . In the case of asset prices and in contrast with the previous results, we …nd that …scal shocks impact negatively and persistently on both housing and equity prices.
A possible explanation for such asymmetric response of output and asset prices over the two subsamples may lay on the fact that …nancial deregulation has progressively changed the degree of e¤ec-tiveness of …scal policy, as well as the way it is perceived by markets'participants. We investigate this issue in the next sub-Section. 
Does …nancial deregulation matter?
Until the early eighties, mortgage markets were, in general, highly regulated. Interest rate ceilings and quantitative limits on credit and repayment periods often led to chronic or temporary credit rationing.
This made it di¢ cult for households to access credit and increased the sensitivity of demand to shocks in disposable income (Girouard and Blondal, 2001) . In this context, one would expect that the positive e¤ect on private income due to an expansionary …scal policy also generates a rise in the demand of asset markets and, consequently, asset prices.
In contrast, when the deregulation process started, credit constraints on households and …rms become more relaxed and access to mortgage credit broadened (Diamond and Lea, 1992) . Because of the enhanced opportunities to smooth consumption vis-a-vis temporary ‡uctuations in income and to hedge against unfavorable labour income shocks, households' demand may have become less dependent on current income. Similarly, the incidence of mortgage market deregulation may signi…cantly a¤ect the probability of extreme variations in asset prices (Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009 ). These features could partially explain the high degree of uncertainty regarding the size of the e¤ect of …scal shocks on GDP in the post-1984 sub-sample.
In addition, the asymmetric response of asset prices that one observes for the two sub-samples may be linked to the increase of competition in the banking sector. In fact, in a context of high degree of liberalization and market integration, the competitiveness of the banking sector becomes strongly dependent on the quality of national policy's formulation and implementation, and on the credibility of government's commitment to such policies. As a result, an expansionary …scal policy might be interpreted by markets as signalling a deterioration of public …nances (Ardagna, 2009 ) or a lack of …scal discipline . This, in turn, may induce the private sector to dramatically increase savings and persistently reduce investment in housing and stock markets.
In order to uncover the dynamics behind the patterns of the impulse-response functions across di¤erent sub-samples and support our predictions regarding the role played by the …nancial deregulation, we re-estimate the model speci…ed by (1), namely, by accounting for the liberalization process of the mortgage market in each country. Speci…cally, we estimate a dummy-augmented PVAR model of the form:
where Y it is the same vector of endogenous variables de…ned above, and D
BL it
and D
AL it
are dummy variables that capture the process of deregulation in the mortgage markets. In particular, for each
takes the value of one before the deregulation process started, and zero once it is in place. Similarly, D AL it takes the value of one after the deregulation process has taken place, and zero otherwise. Table 4 summarizes the starting dates of the most relevant …nancial deregulation measures a¤ecting the housing markets in the countries included in the sample. In the majority of countries, the process of liberalization consisted of a deregulation of interest rates (Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) or a lifting of credit controls (Finland, France and Italy). Figures 6 and 7 plot the impulse-response functions to a shock to …scal policy, respectively, before and after the deregulation process. The results corroborate our previous …ndings and conjectures. In particular, one can see that in a context of highly deregulated markets, …scal policy may be particularly ine¤ective. Most importantly, an expansionary …scal policy may increase the vulnerability of real estate and …nancial markets. In fact, markets will immediately interpret the measure as a deterioration of the …scal stance and a threat to long-term sustainability of public …nances (Hallett and Lewis, 2008) . As a result, both stock prices and housing prices signi…cantly and persistently fall in the "after deregulation"
period. Against this background, we assess the extent to which a …scal stimulus contributes to the strength of the economic recovery. Speci…cally, we investigate whether …scal policy shocks undertaken during housing bust phases can have an important multiplier e¤ect on the economy. To shed some light on this question, we estimate a dummy-augmented version of the PVAR speci…ed in (1). More speci…cally, we consider the following model:
where Y it is the same vector of endogenous variables as de…ned above, D B it is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in case of an episode of bust in the housing prices in period t in country i, and zero, otherwise. Similarly, D
N B it
de…nes a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the absence of housing price busts in period t in country i, and zero otherwise.
In order to detect the bust episodes, we use a non-parametric approach and, following Agnello and Schuknecht (2009), we de…ne a bust in housing prices as a major and persistent downward deviation from their trend computed by a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) …lter with a smoothing parameter of 100,000. Therefore, a bust corresponds to a negative deviation (more than 5%) and persistent (at least twelve quarters) of housing prices from the trend. 8 . Using this de…nition, we are able to identify the bust episodes reported in Table 6 . Note: A bust is de…ned as a negative (more than 5%) and persistent (at least twelve quarters) deviation of housing prices from their trend. Figure 8 displays the impulse-response functions to a …scal shock during busts in housing prices.
We can see that unexpected variation in the …scal stance persistently drives up both housing and stock prices. Consistent with the previous …ndings, while the reaction of housing prices is gradual, stock prices immediately adjust to the shock. Fiscal policy also has a positive and persistent e¤ect on GDP in a Keynesian manner. This, therefore, suggests that a stimulus package implemented during a bust in housing prices is likely to have the largest multiplier impact.
The e¤ectiveness of …scal policy seems to be the result of both the "direct" e¤ects of policy measures and the "indirect" e¤ects arising from movements in real interest rates. In a context where the private sector is unwilling to spend and invest on asset prices, an expansionary …scal policy stimulates aggregate demand per se, namely, via public investment and public consumption (the "direct" e¤ect). In addition, it may lead to a ‡ip in expectations of market participants which can move from being de ‡ationary to being in ‡ationary. In fact, as time goes by and …scal policy exerts its expansionary e¤ects on output, consumer and …rm's con…dence levels may be restored, inducing an upward revision in price level expectations. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in real interest rates, thereby, amplifying the overall size of the …scal multiplier (the "indirect" e¤ect).
Summing up, in comparison with the results of the baseline model, one concludes that, conditioning the e¤ects of …scal policy on the occurrence of a bust in housing prices, there is a great scope for short-term …scal policy stimulus. In fact, our …ndings suggest that in the presence of a strong fall in aggregate demand and sharp corrections in real estate and …nancial wealth, there is little room for adverse interest rate adjustments. As a result, …scal stimulus appears to be particularly helpful in boosting the economic recovery and less prone in crowding-out private spending. 
Conclusion
The current …nancial crisis has demonstrated that the …nancial system, the housing sector, and the banking sector are strongly connected and may a¤ect the nexus between monetary stability and …nancial stability (Castro, 2008; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a ) and/or impinge on business cycle Despite this, the empirical linkages between …scal policy innovations and asset markets have not been explored and a good understanding of the transmission mechanism of …scal policy measures to asset prices has not been provided yet.
In the present work, we try to …ll those gaps. Using a panel VAR and quarterly data for ten industrialized countries, we show that a positive …scal policy shock has a negative impact in both stock prices and housing prices. However, while stock prices immediately adjust to the shock and the e¤ect is merely temporary, housing prices exhibit strong persistence and remain depressed even thirty quarters-ahead. As a result, governments may …nd it quite di¢ cult to mitigate movements in stock prices without disrupting the behaviour of housing markets.
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The robustness of the results is assessed in several directions. First, we …nd that the expansionary e¤ect of …scal policy has somewhat weakened in the recent times and, as a result, asset markets became more sensitive to a deterioration in the …scal stance. Second, the process of …nancial deregulation and mortgage liberalization might have contributed to the change in the degree of e¤ectiveness of …scal policy, as the competitiveness of national banking sector becomes strongly related to the commitment of government to credible sound policies. This, in turn, gives rise to the importance of …scal discipline (Hallett, 2008; . Third, we show that …scal policy actions can have signi…cant multiplier e¤ects when undertaken in the outcome of severe housing busts, therefore, suggesting the importance of the implementation of …scal stimulus packages.
While our paper focuses on the role that …scal policy plays in leading asset price dynamics, one may also question on whether asset prices in ‡uence …scal policy. We …nd that stock price shocks impact more on …scal policy than housing price shocks. As a result, they may contribute more decisively to the goal of …scal consolidation.
A Data Description
A.1 Belgium Data

GDP
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.124.9.9B.B$$.Z.W.$$$"). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period
